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In the euphoria generated by the downfall of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian dictators and the anxieties produced by the uncertain fate 
of recent uprisings in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, it is easy to lose 
sight of the underlying importance of the economic conditions facing 
the new republics that are emerging in the Middle East. 
With an entire region’s political landscape potentially being reshaped, 
the relevance of the ‘dismal science’ is perhaps not obvious. Indeed, for 
the masses who are risking their lives to get rid of autocratic leaders, 
it follows axiomatically that the new order should offer them better 
economic conditions—regardless of the constraints and uncertainties. 
However, past trends do not offer useful insights into the region’s future. 
During 2000-10, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and Egypt all achieved—under 
dictators—respectable growth rates of real GDP, namely, 4-5% a 
year (Figure 1). But the hoped-for trickle-down effect of such growth 
either failed to materialise or was not sufficiently robust to prevent 
widespread and deepening disillusionment and unrest. 
Against this background, the enormity of the task ahead for new 
regimes is only just beginning to dawn. While direct disruptions and 
closures caused by revolutionary turmoil can be quickly left behind 
(and these were admittedly short-lived in Tunisia and Egypt), the same 
cannot be said of the impact of the explosion in popular expectations 
that has accompanied such regime changes. 
Egypt’s Conditions
For example, in a country like Egypt, where living standards have been 
eroded by double-digit inflation in recent years and food inflation 
is currently more than 20% and rising, a new government will find it 
hard to turn a blind eye to the plight of low-income groups. Based on 
a national income threshold for overall poverty, 40% of Egyptians are 
estimated to be poor, for example. 
Last February’s 15% increase in public-service wages cost the 
government about seven billion Egyptian pounds (US$1.2b). Similarly, 
government expenditure in the current financial year is expected to rise 
by a quarter, with salaries for Egypt’s 5.8 million public-sector workers 
increasing by 20% and expenditures on health and education also 
expanding. Egypt is now a net oil importer and fuel subsidies alone 
add up to about $16.6 billion annually—accounting for a fifth of all 
government spending. 
Revolutionary upheavals are well-known for causing economic 
disruptions.  Iran’s revolution in 1979 ended two decades of average 9% 
annual economic growth under the Shah; but in the first decade after 
the revolution, the country’s real GDP shrank by almost 1.5% per annum. 
True, some of this decline was caused by the devastating eight-year 
war with Iraq and the collapse of international oil prices, but important 
internal factors were at work too, such as expropriations, capital flight 
and policy confusions and ambiguities. 
Egypt now faces some of the same problems. Tourism, which employs 
two million people and generated a total income of $12 billion (5.3% of 
GDP) in 2010, fell by almost half in the first quarter of 2011. The loss of 
tourism is currently costing Egypt about $1 billion a month. 
The country also relies on a large volume of remittances from its 
temporary workers in oil-rich states in the region. For example, 1.5 
million workers are estimated to have been in Libya when the conflict 
broke out there. A recent downward trend in remittances has made 
another dent in the country’s foreign reserves (which have declined from 
$36 billion in January to $28 billion in May). 
The overall consequences of the unrest have been dire: Egypt’s economy 
is projected to shrink by about 3% this year; factories are reportedly 
working at half capacity; unemployment is now officially at double-digit 
levels (up from 9% in the last quarter of 2010 to nearly 12% in the first 
quarter of 2011); and the budget deficit is expected to worsen, from 
8.6% of GDP to around 11%.
The Threat of Conditionalities
The resultant rapid shrinking of ‘fiscal space’ has, not surprisingly, left 
Egypt’s finance minister, Samir Radwan, in search of short-term fixes. 
The IMF’s recent agreement to provide Egypt with a standby loan of $3 
billion was officially described as helping with the country’s ‘economic 
recovery, generating jobs, and assisting low-income households.’ 
This might provide welcome short-term relief, but the spectre of 
submitting to IMF conditions is hardly comforting for Egyptians. Despite 
official assurances by Mr Radwan that Egypt shall not be “accepting any 
conditionality—none whatsoever”, the experience of other countries 
that have resorted to IMF financing suggests otherwise.
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Figure 1: Real GDP Growth Rate (2000-10) (Average annual %)
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Indeed, the communiqué from the G8 leaders that announced a $20 
billion commitment to assist with long-term development in Tunisia and 
Egypt explicitly linked the assistance to reforms to promote ‘democratic 
and tolerant societies’ in these countries. Whether any generosity from 
the Gulf states will be free from strings is also doubtful since an occasion 
to assist an ally also opens up new opportunities for widening regional 
influence for any governments with the spare cash to hand out.
Short-term difficulties should not, however, be exaggerated just as 
realism about current challenges should not be allowed to detract from 
the exciting and long-overdue opportunities for transformation that are 
now available to the region. 
So what lies ahead and how can the new governments make sure that 
their future record of economic growth and development is radically 
different from the legacy left by the ousted dictators?
The Road Ahead
One of the critical economic lessons of the last decade has been that it is 
not growth per se but the type of growth that matters. As Figure 1 above 
showed, the MENA region as a whole experienced average annual 
growth of nearly 5% during 2000-2010, a rate that compared favourably 
with those of regions of similar income levels. For example, the growth 
rate of Latin America and the Caribbean was only 3.4%.
Yet, the region’s Achilles heel has been its inability to translate such 
growth into ample productive jobs for its youthful population.  As is 
well known, MENA’s population is generally very young. The working-
age youth (those between 15 and 29 years of age) account for about 
one-quarter to one-third of the total population across countries in 
the region. Similarly, the median age in the region is among the lowest 
in the world. For Tunisia and Egypt, for instance, it is 29 and 24 years 
respectively; for the West Bank and Gaza it is 20 years and for Yemen as 
low as 17 years. 
Unfortunately, this youth bulge in the region suffers from high 
unemployment rates. Figure 2 shows that while the total unemployment 
rate is in double digits across the region, youth unemployment is often 
twice as high (between two and four out of ten people aged 15 to 25 
years are unemployed). 
The new republics will thus be judged ultimately by their abilities (or 
failures) to bring about lasting transformations in the livelihoods of 
ordinary people, particularly the young, who badly need greater access 
to opportunities for productive employment. 
Thus, imaginative and bold development strategies will be needed, 
including growth strategies that are job-centred, inclusive and 
responsive to the aspirations of the youth, who have been the driving 
force behind recent uprisings. 
Neither populism (stressing redistribution at the expense of growth) 
nor its polar opposite, neoliberalism (putting growth before equity and 
redistribution), can be the way forward. The experience of countries 
such as Brazil, Chile and Turkey—past autocracies that have been 
successfully transformed into today’s democracies—shows that 
growth and distribution policies need not be at odds with each other. 
New regimes in the Middle East can draw valuable lessons from such 
experiences to seize an historic opportunity for real change.
In the short and medium terms, the road ahead is likely to be bumpy. 
Striking a balance between satisfying the legitimate aspirations 
for social justice at home with the imperatives of maintaining 
independence in the face of pressures from abroad will continue to be 
a formidable challenge. For some time to come, therefore, it will look 
as if the new republics in the Middle East are being obliged to choose 
between a ‘rock and a hard place’. 
An earlier version of this text was first published in the 
UAE’s daily newspaper, The National on 18 June 2011
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Figure 2: Total Unemployment and Youth Unemployment Rates* (%) 
Selected Arab Countries (2010)
The aim of the LMEI, through education and research, is to promote knowledge of all as-
pects of the Middle East including its complexities, problems, achievements and assets, 
both among the general public and with those who have a special interest in the region. 
In this task it builds on two essential assets. First, it is based in London, a city which has 
unrivalled contemporary and historical connections and communications with the 
Middle East including political, social, cultural, commercial and educational aspects. 
Secondly, the LMEI is closely linked to SOAS, the only tertiary educa-
tional institution in the world whose explicit purpose is to provide educa-
tion and scholarship on the whole Middle East from prehistory until today.
